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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.

May a trained narcotics detection dog sniff the air at the front door of a suspected
marijuana grow house without violating the resident’s Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable searches?

n.

Under the Fourth Amendment, is a sniff of air by a trained narcotics detection dog where
two law enforcement officers are legally present reasonable with less than probable
cause?
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No. 11-564
IN THE
♦-

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FALL TERM 2012

THE STATE OF FLORIDA,
Petitioner,
V.

JOELIS JARDINES,
Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the Supreme Court of the State of Florida is reported at Jardines v. State
ofFla. {Jardines 11), 73 So.3d 34 (Fla. 2011).

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of a State Supreme Court interpreting
the protections of the United States Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (West 2012). This Court
granted a writ of certiorari on January 6,2012.

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court has held that “the ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable
cause to make a warrantless search should be reviewed de novo."’’’ Ornelas v. United States, 517
U.S. 690, 691 (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Statement of the Facts
Detective William Pedraja has been a police officer with the Miami-Dade County Police
Department (“MCPD”) for 17 years. (J.A. 5.) He has trained extensively in narcotics
identification, performed numerous narcotics arrests and searches, has a familiarity with many
drug creation techniques, and has investigated many hydroponic marijuana labs. (J.A. 5.) On
November 3, 2006, the MCPD received an anonymous tip that Respondent’s home contained a
marijuana grow operation. (J.A. 3, 6.) Detective Pedraja began surveillance of the house on
December 6, 2006. (J.A. 8.) Detective Pedraja’s familiarity with the common methods used by
urban marijuana growers led him to believe that the home was being used for the purpose of
growing contraband. (J.A. 6-8.)
At the home, the detective was Joined by members of the MCPD’s Narcotics Bureau and
Drug Enforcement Agency (“DBA”) agents, and began to observe the scene. (J.A. 109.) The
driveway was empty and the window blinds were shut. (J.A. 16.) Despite 66-degree weather,
the air-conditioning unit that served the residence had run for about fifteen minutes without
recycling. (J.A. 32, 38.) Hydroponic marijuana labs require an air-conditioning unit to offset the
heat created by the high intensity bulbs used to mimic daylight, which allows the marijuana to
grow faster. (J.A. 38.) An air-conditioning unit recycles to maintain the temperature within a

' Quality Controlled Local Climatological Data: Hourly Observations Table Opa Locka Airport Miami, FLfor Dec.
2006, NOAA, http;//cdo.ncdc.noaa.gov/qclcd/QCLCD (last visited Oct. 2,2012).
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home, but according to Detective Pedraja, when a unit recycles, it “may result in the odor...
being discharged outside of the home via cooling vents, windows and/or doors.” (J.A. 7.) Such
air-conditioner use causes higher than average home electricity use; however, in the detective’s
experience, hydroponic labs often illegally divert power so that this higher use of electricity does
not show up on power bills. (J.A. 42.)
Detective Pedraja was joined by Detective Bartelt and his K-9 drug detection dog,
Franky. (J.A. 9.) Detective Bartelt has been an officer with the MCPD for seven years, a
member of the Narcotics Bureau for six years, and a canine handler since 2004. (J.A. 9-10.) He
has trained extensively in canine narcotics detection and has conducted over six hundred
investigations. (J.A. 10-11.)

He

also has received weekly maintenance training with Franky.

(J.A. 13.) Franky is trained to detect the smell of narcotics, including marijuana, and to lead his
handler to the source of the narcotics through recognizable behavior changes. (J.A. 9-10.) He
has participated in more than 650 narcotics detection tasks, resulting in nearly 400 positive drug
alerts. (J.A. 13.)
Detective Pedraja observed the home for about 15 to 20 minutes, then went up the
driveway to the front door with Detective Bartelt and Franky. (J.A. 37,49.) On the driveway,
Franky began tracking contraband. (J.A. 53.) At the entrance of the porch, Franky led Detective
Bartelt toward the front door. (J.A. 53.) Franky started “bracketing,” which is a technique used
by narcotics dogs when they reach the “cloud” of narcotic smell to determine the strongest point
of the smell. (J.A. 50-52.) As he sniffed at the base of the front door Franky immediately sat
down, which indicated that he had found the source of the narcotic smell. (J.A. 53.) Detective
Bartelt smelled mothballs at the base of the porch. (J.A. 55.) The detective then took Franky
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back to his car, told Detective Pedraja that the front door was the source of the smell, and left to
attend to cases elsewhere. (J.A. 53-54.)
While at the front door, Detective Pedraja smelled manjuana. (J.A. 112) The detective
attempted a “knock and talk,” in which he knocked on the door to request consent to search the
house but received no response. (J.A. 109.) Detective Pedraja then returned to his car and began
preparing the search warrant, which was granted by a Florida court. (J.A. 38.)
The detective executed the search warrant with DEA agents, and upon entry discovered a
marijuana production lab. (J.A. 17.) During the search, Respondent attempted to escape through
the back of the house. (J.A. 17.) After he was caught. Respondent confessed both orally and in a
written statement to Detective Pedraja. (J.A. 17.)
Preliminary Statement
The State of Florida charged Respondent with one count of felony trafficking in
marijuana and one count of grand theft in the third degree. (J.A. 2.)
Prior to trial. Respondent filed a motion to suppress the oral and written confession as
well as the drugs seized during the search, alleging the search was unconstitutional. (J.A. 16-20.)
Specifically, Respondent argued that the search warrant was improperly based on an alert to the
presence of illegal drugs on the property by a trained narcotics detection dog. (J.A. 16.)
The trial court in Miami-Dade County held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to
suppress. (J.A. 21.) The court concluded that Franky alerted to the presence of illegal
contraband before Detective Pedraja smelled marijuana at the house. (J.A. 135, n.l.) The court
also granted the motion to suppress, finding that its authority was constrained by a similar case in
a different judicial district, Florida v. Rabb, 920 So.2d 1175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). (J.A.
134.) The Rabb Court had held that a sniff by a police dog constituted an unreasonable search
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under the Fourth Amendment. Rabb, 920 So.2d at 1187. The court of appeal later noted that
“under Florida Supreme Court precedent, the trial court had no realistic alternative other than to
follow the Fourth District’s decision 'mRabb'^ State ofFlorida v. Jardines {Jardines I), 9 So.3d
1,15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (Cope, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The State of Florida appealed and the District Court of Florida, Third District, reversed
the order to suppress the illegal drugs, and the oral and written confession. Id. at 2. The Third
District Court held that the dog sniff was not a search under the Fourth Amendment and that the
police dog and officers were legally present at the house. Id. at 6, 8. The panel also concluded
that under the inevitable discovery doctrine, regardless of whether the police narcotics dog
alerted to the presence of contraband before Detective Pedraja smelled marijuana, the dmgs
would have been found in the course of Detective Pedraja’s investigation. Id. at 9. The Thu’d
District Court certified a direct conflict between its opinion that a dog sniff is not a search and
the contrary opinion in Rabb. Jardines /, 9 So.3d at 15.
Respondent appealed the reversal of the order to suppress the illegal drugs and confession
to the Florida Supreme Court, which quashed the Third District Court’s decision and approved
the result in Rabb. Jardines II, 73 So.3d at 56. In a split decision, the Supreme Court of Florida
held that the sniff of marijuana at Respondent’s house by the police narcotics dog was a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, despite acknowledging that a dog sniff is
considered "‘sui generis" by the Supreme Court of the United States. Id. at 49.
The State of Florida filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which this court granted on
January 6,2012. (J.A. 1.)

5
r

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse the Florida Supreme Court’s decision to suppress evidence
against Respondent, Joelis Jardines. The Fourth Amendment and the Florida State Constitution
protect people against unreasonable searches, but here the dog sniff was reasonable. Because
this case does not involve trespass, this Court should use the established two-fold test to
determine whether a person has a privacy interest in a contested area, requiring Respondent to
demonstrate both a subjective and an objective expectation of privacy. Here, Respondent did not
have a privacy expectation in the smells caused by his hydroponic marijuana grow operation.
Respondent failed to demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy in his front porch
because it was open to the public. Likewise, society does not condone such an expectation of
privacy because Respondent’s front porch was not within the curtilage of his home. Even if
society does condone such an interest, the police had a lawful right to go to his front door, and
the drug sniff docs not violate Respondent’s rights either through use of technology or as a
physical intrusion on his privacy interests. Additionally, this Court has held that people do not
have a privacy interest in contraband. Finally, this Court has never held that a drug sniff by a
trained police dog is a Fourth Amendment search.
Alternatively, this Court should conclude that use of a dog sniff is subject only to a
reasonable suspicion standard, as this Court has held with regard to stop and frisks. Reasonable
suspicion is the proper standard because the government interest in law enforcement and crime
prevention outweighs the minimal intrusion upon Respondent’s privacy interest caused by a dog
sniff. Detective Pedraja possessed reasonable suspicion that Respondent’s house contained a
hydroponic marijuana grow operation based upon the totality of the circumstances, making the
dog sniff reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

6
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Similarly, this Court should hold that Franky’s sniff outside Respondent’s house was per
se reasonable because a dog sniff is siii generis - a category unto itself. This Court has indicated

that a dog sniff is merely one component of a single investigation. The Court determines
whether the overarching investigation is constitutional based on its context. Accordingly,
Franky’s sniff and positive alert to contraband was constitutional because Detectives Pedraja and
Bartelt were legally present outside Respondent’s house. Accordingly, this Court should
overturn the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion suppressing evidence of Respondent’s marijuana
cultivation.
ARGUMENT
I.

EVIDENCE OF MARIJUANA CULTIVATION SHOULD NOT BE SUPPRESSED
BECAUSE A SNIFF OF AIR BY A TRAINED NARCOTICS DETECTION DOG
OUTSIDE A HOUSE IS NOT A SEARCH FOR WHICH THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT REQUIRES A WARRANT.
To protect people against unreasonable government intrusions, the Fourth Amendment

states, “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause ....” ^ U.S. Const, amend. IV. Justice Harlan, in a concurrence, announced a
two-part test, which this Court later adopted, that identified the limits of Fourth Amendment
protections against unreasonable searches. See California v. Ciraoloy 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986)
(citing United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., Concurring));

also

Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 89 (1998). The test is based on this Court’s recognition that

“the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. The two-part test
questions (1) whether an individual has manifested “an actual (subjective) expectation of
* The protections of the United States Constitution govern this case because the Florida Constitution provides
identical protections against government searches and seizures. Fla. Const, art. I, § 12. Specifically, the Florida
Constitution states that the right against government intrusions “shall be construed in conformity with the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.” Id.

1

r

privacy” and (2) whether that subjective expectation of privacy is honored by society at large as
reasonable. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Although this Court recognizes other Fourth Amendment tests, Justice Harlan’s two-part
expectation of privacy test governs this case. This Court has also identified violations of the
Fourth Amendment using a “common-law trespassory test.” United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct.
945, 952 (2012). The test emphasizes common-law trespass in questioning whether law
enforcement physically intruded upon private property unlawfully. Id. at 949. However, this
Court acknowledged in Jones that situations not involving trespass are analyzed under the Katz
two-part expectation of privacy test. Id. at 953. Because this case does not involve trespass, the
Katz standard is the appropriate test.

Here, evidence of Respondent’s marijuana cultivation should not be suppressed because
it was obtained pursuant to a legal dog sniff outside Respondent’s house. While this Court
enforces the Fourth Amendment by suppressing evidence that was obtained in violation of the
restraints identified by the two-part expectation of privacy test, Respondent could have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in marijuana cultivation, and society does not honor any
expectation of privacy in illegal drugs. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the Florida
Supreme Court and hold that a sniff of air by a trained narcotics detection dog outside a house is
not a search regulated by the Fourth Amendment.
A.

Respondent Had Neither a Subjective nor an Objective Expectation of Privacy in
His Front Porch.

Respondent has no privacy interest in his front porch according to Justice Harlan’s twopart test as defined in his Katz concurrence. The test requires Respondent to have both a
subjective and an objective privacy interest in the front porch of his home. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361
(Harlan, J., concurring).

8

1.

Respondent does not have a subjective e^ectation of privacy in his front
porch because he did not manifest a privacy interest in that area.

The subjective factor requires that the Respondent “manifested a subjective expectation
of privacy in the object of the challenged search ...Ciraolo. 476 U.S. at 211 (citing Smith v.
Miifylantl, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)). The Court found that the defendant in Ciraolo had. by

erecting a 10-foot fence around his home, manifested a privacy interest “from at least street-level
views.” 476 U.S. at211.
Here, Respondent took no steps to show neighbors, strangers or police that he intended to
keep his front porch private. He had not erected a fence, nor had he put up a “Keep Out” sign.
His front porch — so far as privacy interests are concerned — was unremarkable compared to those
in a typical neighborhood. It is true that Respondent had, by closing his blinds, manifested an
interest in the interior of the home, but the dog sniff did not occur within his home. The sniff
was conducted on Respondent’s porch, and thus went no further than he had invited the public.
(J.A. 16.)
Respondent’s failure to manifest a privacy interest alone shows that he did not have a
subjective expectation of privacy, but he also took actions to indicate that he expected the public
would come to his front door. Respondent placed mothballs at the base of his front porch,
which, with their own distinctive odor, could mask the smell of marijuana. (J.A. 55.) This
action indicates that he knew people approaching his front door would smell the drugs, and
possibly report the smell to the police. Respondent failed to take actions to exclude people from
his porch, and knew that the public would be able to approach his front door. Indeed, he
expected them to do so, and thus did not have a subjective expectation of privacy there.

9

r

2

Respondent does not have an objective expectation
‘
porch because it was outside the curtilage of his home and Florida does
not recognize a privacy interest in front porches.

Similarly, an expectation of privacy in the front porch of a person’s home is not one that
society is willing to consider “reasonable.” to Kat.. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
This is especially true when the expectation of pnvacy is not clearly expressed. Neighbors and
community members who might request a cup of sugar or discuss a local ballot are accustomed
to honoring “Keep Out” and “No Solicitations” signs. Here, Respondent’s neighbors, much less
police officers conducting a knock and talk, had no indication that Respondent considered his
front porch off limits. Thus, police should not be expected to honor an unexpressed privacy
interest in Respondent’s front porch.
Additionally, Respondent’s front porch stands outside his home’s curtilage, and therefore
he had no reasonable expectation of privacy there. The Court has often used a curtilage analysis
to determine whether a person carries a privacy interest in a disputed area of their property. See
Oliver V. United States. 466 U.S. 170, 179-80 (1984). The curtilage is “considered part of the

home for Fourth Amendment purposes.” Id. at 180. This Court believes:
that curtilage questions should be resolved
witWn
the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the ar
an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature o ® “
observation by people
and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by p P
passing by.
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987).

While the porch is adjacent to the interior of the home proper, arguably satisfying the first
factor, it is not necessarily part of the curtilage, as the remaining factors outweigh the proximity
consideration. The second factor is not satisfied because the record does not indicate that any
enclosure surrounded the home. There was an archway at the entrance to the porch, but the court
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in Dunn was considering enclosures such as fences. 480 U.S. at 302; (J.A. 50.) The third factor
asks whether “intimate activities of the home” occur in the area being analyzed. Dunn. 480 U.S.
at 302. The porch and front door are visible to the public from the street, so it is unlikely that
^

any intimate, private activity would occur there. Finally, the front porch was not protected from
observation; the record does not indicate any obstruction that would prevent Detective Pedraja
and others from performing surveillance on the house. (J.A. 32.) The front porch was exposed
to public view and unprotected, which outweighs the proximity factor. Accordingly,
Respondent’s front porch was not part of the curtilage of the house.
A privacy interest in a smell coming from inside the home is also unreasonable under the
plain view doctrine. As Justice Harlan said in Katz, “objects, activities, or statements that [one]
exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no intention to keep them to
[oneself] has been exhibited.” 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). This doctrine

A

encompasses smells. “The ‘plain smell’ doctrine. In turn, is simply a logical extension of the
‘plain view’ doctrine ...United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738, 747 (10th Cir. 2006)
(citation omitted). Standing on Respondent’s porch, Detective Pedraja could smell live
marijuana plants. (J.A. 16). As discussed below, the use of a drug sniffing dog does not change
this analysis. Respondent allowed the smell of marijuana to emanate from his home and into an
/-

area where he anticipated public contact. In doing so, he exposed the smell to the public.
Accordingly, Respondent had no privacy interest in the smell of the contraband that was present
on his front porch.
Further, Florida law does not offer a heightened privacy protection in a person’s front
porch. Relevant case law unambiguously states that individuals do not have a privacy interest in
their front porches. The Florida Supreme Court has held that, while a police officer illegally
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entered a person’s backyard when a neighbor complained of a marijuana grow operation,
“[ujnder Florida law it is clear that one does not harbor an expectation of privacy on a front
porch where salesmen or visitors may appear at any time.” Florida v. Morsman, 394 So.2d 408,
409 (Fla. 1981) (citing Florida v. Detlefson, 335 So.2d 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Florida v.
Belcher, 317 So.2d 842 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)).

Floridians clearly have no expectation of privacy in their front porches. Police are not
prohibited from being there, and anything that takes place on an unprotected porch is exposed to
the public. Not only did Respondent fail to indicate a desire for privacy in his front porch,
society at large, and Florida specifically, is not “prepared to recognize [that interest] as
‘reasonable.’” Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
B.

Drug Sniffing Does Are Not Technology that Encroaches on Fourth Amendment
Rights.

While drug sniffing dogs are employed to detect odors that might otherwise be beyond
the senses of police officers, they are a permissible use of technology, far removed from the
concerns that Justice Harlan expressed in Katz. There, he wrote that “reasonable expectations ot
privacy may be defeated by electronic as well as physical invasion.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 362
(Harlan, J., concurring). Thus, police may not use technology as an end run around the Fourth
Amendment. Privacy may still be invaded despite what may appear to be a passive police role.
However, the dog sniff in the present case did not invade Respondent’s protected physical space.
The sniff could reveal only the presence or absence of contraband to the officers. Furthermore,
the sniff is analogous to other devices used by law enforcement that this Court has held do not
cause investigations to be considered searches. Therefore, the sniff did not violate Respondent s
privacy right.
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1.

Airplanes have been used to discover contraband on private property
without violating Fourth Amendment rights and dogs serve police in the
same capacity.

This Court has held that police uses of aircraft to observe contraband growing in
residents’ unprotected backyards are not searches. For the purposes of Fourth Amendment
analysis, the use of drug sniffing dogs is analogous to the use of aircraft, because they each serve
similar functions as tools of law enforcement.
In Ciraolo, police were unable to see into the defendant’s backyard because there was a
fence around the residence. 476 U.S. at 209. The court recognized that, at least from street
level, the defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy, and, further, that the backyard was
likely a part of the curtilage of the home. Id. at 211 -13. However, because the garden was not
protected from aerial views, the defendant there did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy,
so the police could take an aircraft into public airspace at 1,000 feet and observe the marijuana
plants. Id. at 213. The Court noted that “[a]ny member of the public flying in this airspace who
glanced down could have seen everything that these officers observed.” Id. at 213-14. Since this
is “an age where private and commercial flight in the public airways is routine, it is unreasonable
for [rjespondent to expect that his marijuana plants were constitutionally protected from being
observed with the naked eye from an altitude of 1,000 feet.” Id. at 215. The public was able to
legally act in the same manner as the police and, in the eyes of the Court, did so routinely, thus
there was no infringement on the defendant’s privacy. See also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445,
451 (1989) (relying on Ciraolo, police use of a helicopter at 400 feet above ground is not a
search because the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his partially
open greenhouse viewed from navigable airspace).

Respondent did not expose his marijuana grow lab itself to the public, but he did expose
the smell of the plants to the outside world. Any member of thtvpublic could have stepped onto
his front porch and smell it. While it is true that a dog’s ability to detect odors is more enhanced
than a human’s, this is no different from using a plane to allow observation from the air. Human
beings, by their faculties alone, could not enter the airspace that would allow them to view a yard
from above. A person would have to purchase a plane or a plane ticket to make these
observations. This Court considered both private and commercial flight routine. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. at 214. Ownership of dogs is equally routine. Indeed, it is more likely that a person would
come to the front porch of a home with a dog than that they would purchase a plane to make
observations of a neighbor’s back yard. Further, drug sniffing dogs are freely available for
purchase by the public.^
That the dog has been trained to detect and alert police to the presence of contraband
makes no difference. In Ciraolo, this Court deemed the officer’s training to recognize marijuana
“irrelevant” because “[a]ny member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could
have seen everything that these officers observed.” 476 U.S. at 213-14. Dogs have a better
sense of smell than humans, therefore any dog near a home with a marijuana grow lab may smell
the contraband. The fact that a dog is trained to recognize and conununicate this information to a
handler is similarly irrelevant. Dogs and airplanes are potential tools of law enforcement, and
enhance the ability of police to enforce the law in similar ways. The use of airplanes in public
airspace is not a Fourth Amendment search, and this Court should similarly hold that dog sniffs
are not searches.

^ Drug Detection Dogs, Southern Coast K9, Inc., (2010) http://www.southemcoastk9.conv'Drug-Dogs (last visited
September 25, 2012).

2.

Dog sniffs are not physically invasive and do not indiscriminately reveal
the contents of a house.

Dog sniffs, unlike intrusive technology and other technologies that search
indiscriminately, do not invade Fourth Amendment privacy rights. The special nature of a dog
sniff distinguishes it from intrusive and indiscriminate technology. First, in Silverman v. United
States, this Court found that the use of a “spike” microphone to eavesdrop on conversations in a

home was a violation of the defendant’s rights because it was “accomplished by means of... a
physical intrusion ...365 U.S. 505, 506-09 (1961). A dog sniff presents no such intrusion.
Though the dog smelled plants located inside the home, the cloud of odor that the dog smelled
was outside the home. (J.A. 50-52.) Franky tracked the smell to its strongest point - the front
door - and showed Detective Bartelt he had found the source of the smell by sitting, at which
time the dog sniff ended. (J.A. 63.) The drug sniff presented no physical invasion of the
protected area of Respondent’s house.
More recently, in Kyllo v. United States, this Court invalidated the use of thermal
imaging devices on a residence. 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001). This Court held that where “the
Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that
would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a search
and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.” Id. at 40. The Kyllo Court rejected the
Government’s contention that knowledge of the heat emanating from the home would not show
private activity because the device might show, “for example, at what hour each night the lady of
the house takes her daily sauna and bath ....” Id. at 37-38. The fact that something much more
mundane might be revealed was of no matter to this Court because any details “were intimate
details because they were details of the home ... .” Id at 38.
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While a dog sniff does reveal details about the home, these are not “intimate” details
because a dog sniff, as a police procedure, can only detect contraband, in which Respondent does
not have a privacy interest. See United States v. Jacobsen. 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984). These two
tools of law enforcement function in similar ways, but there are key distinctions that place dogs
and thermal imaging devices on either side of the Fourth Amendment analysis. A thermal
imaging device indiscriminately detects heat signatures. Similarly, when a dog uses its sense of
smell, it cannot choose to smell one thing and not another. However, while a dog can detect all
smells greater than a human being can, it is only trained to alert a police officer to the presence
of illegal contraband, as Franky did here. (J.A. 13.) A thermal imaging device, on the other
hand, has no mechanism that allows the device to filter activity or objects from review based
upon a legitimate privacy interest. A drug sniffmg dog will only indicate to a police officer the
presence of narcotics. The information gathered by the police about a small spectrum of smells,
contraband alone, should not run afoul of this Court’s holding in Kyllo because a person has no
privacy interest in that contraband. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123. The dog sniff used by
Detectives Pedraja and Bartelt invaded no privacy interest, either through physical invasion or
detection of private matters, and thus is not a search for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
C.

This Court, and Other Federal and State Courts. Have Overwhelmingly Held that
a Dog Sniff Is Not a Fourth Amendment Search.
1.

There is no legitimate expectation of privacy in contraband and a dog sniff
detects nothing but contraband and is minimally invasive.

This Court’s decisions in United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) and. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109, have been applied to a variety of cases involving dog sniffs. A majority of courts have
held, in a variety of factual circumstances, that dog sniffs are not searches. Only the Second

Circuit has held that a dog sniff is a search. That court, as well as the Florida Supreme Court,
misapplied the law.
In Place, this Court was asked to decide whether law enforcement officers had
permissibly detained luggage at an airport for exposure to a dog sniff, and concluded that a dog
sniff was not a Fourth Amendment search. 462 U.S. at 707. The officers suspected the
respondent in that case, Place, was carrying contraband in his luggage because of his behavior
and discrepancies in the address tags on his luggage. Id. at 698. Place refused to consent to a
search of his luggage; the officers took the luggage and had a narcotics dog sniff the bags. Id. at
699. The dog’s behavior indicated to the officers that there was contraband in the bags, and on
this test, the officers obtained a search warrant. Id. After determining that the seizure of the
bags was permissible, this Court held that though “a person possesses a privacy interest in the
contents of personal luggage,” the sniff “did not constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 706-07.
This Court stated that “the canine sniff is sui generis^' — a category unto itself- for two
reasons. Id. at 707. First, the nature of the sniff test meant that the bag could remain closed, and,
compared to a hand search by an officer the investigation was “much less intrusive than a typical
search.” Id. Second, “the sniff discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband
item. This limited disclosure... ensures that the owner of the property is not subjected to the
embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive investigative
methods.” Id. Because the Court was “aware of no other investigative procedure that is so
limited,” the sniff did not rise to the level of a search under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
The investigation here was no different. The sniff performed by Franky, handled by
Detective Bartelt, was non-invasive, and disclosed only the presence of contraband. Id. Franky

could not alert Detective Bartelt to the contents of Respondent’s house except narcotics, just as
the dog in Place could neither reveal nor communicate whether tfie luggage contained clothes or
anything other than contraband. 462. U.S. at 707. The investigation took place entirely outside
the home. While there is a privacy interest in the home, just as there is in luggage, the officers
and dogs in Place and this case never saw or smelt anything but the exterior of the articles they
investigated.
In Jacobsen, this Court followed the holding in Place to find that an investigation that
can only “reveal whether a substance is cocaine .. . compromises no legitimate privacy interest,”
and thus does not violate the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123. There, federal agents conducted a field test on a suspicious package.
Id. at 112. Critical to the Jacobsen Court’s analysis, like the analysis in Place, was that the field

test could determine only whether the white powder they were investigating was cocaine, and no
more, “not even whether the substance was sugar or talcum powder.” Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 122.
Because the defendant did not have “an interest in privacy that society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable” in cocaine and the test revealed nothing but the presence or absence of that
narcotic, no search took place. Id. at 122-24. See also Illinois v. Caballes, 125 U.S. 405,409
(2005) (following Place and Jacobsen, finding no Fourth Amendment search in a law
enforcement officer’s use of a drug sniffing dog during a legitimate traffic stop).
Respondent had no legitimate privacy interest in the contraband he grew in his home.
Franky’s sniff could reveal nothing but narcotics. Franky’s only communication to Detective
Bartelt during an investigation comes in the form of an alert, and, per his training, he only alerts
when he smells contraband. (J.A. 13.) The detectives performed no search because their
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investigation was limited to visual observations, an attempted knock and talk, and the smell of
contraband.
Basing their decisions on Place and Jacobsen, a majority of circuit courts have also
found that dog sniffs are not searches. For example, in United States v. Brock, the Seventh
Circuit found that a drug sniff “from the common area of defendant’s residence,” outside of a
locked bedroom was not a search. 417 F.3d 692, 697 (7th Cir. 2005). That court held that the
warrant issued based on that sniff did not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights
because the defendant had no legitimate privacy interest in his contraband, the investigation
revealed only the presence or absence of that contraband, and the police officers were in the
home with the consent of the defendant’s roommates. Id.
Numerous other circuit courts have also relied on this Court’s decisions to find that dog
sniffs are not searches. See United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644, 650 (6th Cir. 1998) (dog sniff
not a search while legally inside a home, looking for a burglar); United States v. Roby, 122 F.3d
1120, 1125 (8th Cir. 1997) (dog sniff outside hotel room not a search); United States v. Vasquez,
909 F.2d 235, 238 (7th Cir. 1990) (dog sniff of garage while in public alley not a search); United
States V. Colyer, 878 F.2d469,477 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (dog sniffoftrainsleepercar while in

public corridor not a search). These decisions show that Place and Jacobsen apply to a variety
of circumstances. The public nature of the investigation in each of those cases was not
determinative, so long as the person did not have a reasonable privacy expectation in the place
investigated, the police activity itself was minimally invasive, and could reveal nothing but
contraband - for which there is no legitimate privacy interest.
As in Place and Jacobsen, Respondent has no legitimate privacy interest in the marijuana
grown at his residence. The limited nature of the investigation, which did not intrude into
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Respondent’s house, could reveal nothing but the presence of a substance Franky was trained to
find - contraband. (J.A. 13.) Because dog sniffs targeting narcotics are minimally invasive, and
only detect the presence or absence of contraband, for which Respondent did not have a
legitimate expectation of privacy, the dog sniff of Respondent’s front porch is not a Fourth
Amendment search.
In Michigan v. Jones, 279 Mich. App. 86 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008), the court held that a dog
sniff, applied in nearly identical factual circumstances to the present case, was not a Fourth
Amendment search. This Court should apply the Michigan court’s reasoning to this case as that
court correctly applies this Court’s decisions to similar factual circumstances. In Michigan v.
Jones, an informant told law enforcement officers that the defendant was growing marijuana in

his residence for possession and sale. Id. at 88. Based on this information and the defendant’s
prior marijuana possession and manufacturing convictions, the officers performed a dog sniff
outside the home that indicated the presence of narcotics. Id. On the basis of this evidence, the
police obtained a search warrant. Id. at 88-89.
Following the decisions in Place, Jacobsen, and Caballes, the Michigan court held that
the dog sniff was not a search and upheld the search warrant. Id. at 99. After first noting that the
officers were legally on the property, the court found the actions of the officers consistent with
Place. Id. at 95-96. As in Place, the court found that the defendant:

possessed a general privacy expectation with respect to his home ... but the
canine sniff from outside the home and from a lawful vantage point could only
disclose the presence of narcotics and not lawful activity and thus did not
constitute a search of the home under the Fourth Amendment because no
legitimate privacy interest was implicated.
Id. at 96. Neither Place nor Caballes, the court said, “contain ... language suggesting that the

analysis would differ... outside the home from a lawful vantage point.” Id. at 95. The key in
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Place was that the sniff could discover nothing but the presence or absence of contraband — not

that the luggage was in a public place. Michigan v. Jones, 279 Mickr App. at 96.
While the officers in Michigan v. Jones were alerted to the defendant’s illegal activities
by an informant, the officers in the present case were tipped by an anonymous source; however,
the remaining circumstances gave Detective Pedraja enough reason to make use of a dog sniff.
(J.A. 8.) The blinds were closed, and there were no cars in the driveway. (J.A. 7.) These factors
taken together would lead a highly experienced officer trained in narcotics to have a strong
suspicion that the home contained narcotics. (J.A. 5-7.) The officers in Michigan v. Jones had
only one piece of evidence to suspect the presence of contraband in a home. 279 Mich. App. at
88. Here, Detective Pedraja supplemented the tip by combining his experience and training to
analyze multiple indications of illegal activity in Respondent’s home. (J.A. 5, 7.) The levels of
suspicion in this case and Michigan v. Jones were nearly identical, making the Michigan Court
of Appeals’ reasoning applicable to this case. Franky the narcotics dog would either alert to the
presence of contraband, or not, invading on no legitimate privacy expectation of Respondent.
Even if this Court does not consider the levels of suspicion equal, the reasoning of the
Michigan court still shows that the dog sniff performed on Respondent’s front porch is not a
search. The officers were legally present on Respondent’s front porch, performing a dog snitf
that did not invade his property rights, and would either alert the police to contraband, or give no
alert. Respondent has no privacy interest in the contraband, and thus, since the police sought no
other information about the home, they did not violate Respondent’s rights under the Fourth
Amendment.
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2.
%

The dog sniff was not an embarrassment for Respondent and could not
reveal intimate details of the home.

The Florida Supreme Court incorrectly distinguished this case from this Court’s
jurisprudence by mischaracterizing the record. The Court reasoned that a dog sniff “constitutes
an intrusive procedure that may expose the resident to public opprobrium, humiliation and
embarrassment,” and therefore “does not only reveal the presence of contraband ...Jardines
77,73 So.3dat 49.
This case, the court reasoned, was unlike Place and others because in those cases “there
was no evidence of overbearing or harassing government conduct.” Id. at 45. Here, instead, the
sniff test was not “a casual affair” but a “vigorous and intensive procedure” that “was the end
result of a sustained and coordinated effort by various law enforcement departments.” Id at 4648. The record does not support this assertion. While it is true that the MCPD and DBA were
present, only Detectives Bartelt and Pedraja approached the door. (J.A. 16.) The remaining
agents and officers merely conducted surveillance; their detection — which the court reasoned
would cause public embarrassment - was highly unlikely and antithetical to the practice of
surveillance. (J.A. 16.)
The court also made note of both state and circuit court cases finding that dog sniffs
outside of residences were Fourth Amendment searches including United States v. Thomas, 757
F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985) and Rabb, 920 So.2d 1175. However, both cases misapplied this
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
The Second Circuit misapplied Place. In Thomas, the court “recognized the heightened
privacy interest that an individual has in his dwelling place” and found that, because it
considered a dog sniff to be “a significant enhancement accomplished by a... superior...
sensory instrument,” the police had impermissibly infringed on the defendant’s Fourth
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Amendment rights. Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1366-67. However, as Michigan v. Jones noted, the
holding in Place was based on the sui generis nature of the sniff- it invades no legitimate
**

privacy interest and is not intrusive — not on the location of the search. 279 Mich. App. at 96.
The Rabb court mistakenly held that this Court’s decision in Kyllo was dispositive.
Rabb, 920 So.2d at 1184. However, Kyllo, as discussed above, held that the use of a thermal

imaging device was a Fourth Amendment search because it could reveal “intimate details” of the
home, including details that are protected by the Fourth Amendment. 533 U.S. at 37. The search
could reveal details beyond those that the Court in Jacobsen considered outside the scope of the
Fourth Amendment’s protections. 466 U.S. at 123.
Dog sniffs are minimally intrusive, and detect only contraband - substances for which
there is no expectation of privacy. The dog sniff, while conducted at Respondent’s home, a
place that contains a strong privacy interest, revealed nothing about his house but the presence or
absence of narcotics. The procedure was not invasive, and did not carry a risk of public
embarrassment for Respondent. Therefore, the dog sniff at Respondent’s front door was not a
search for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
II.

ALTERNATIVELY, EVIDENCE OF DRUGS SHOULD NOT BE SUPPRESSED
BECAUSE A SNIFF OF AIR BY A TRAINED NARCOTICS DETECTION DOG
OUTSIDE A HOUSE IS A REASONABLE SEARCH UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT.
Even if a sniff of air by a trained narcotics detection dog outside a house is considered a

search regulated by the Fourth Amendment, two alternative theories demonstrate that the sniff
here was constitutional. First, this Court should conclude that a sniff of air by a trained
narcotics detection dog outside a house requires only that law enforcement have reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity within the house. Alternatively, this Court should affirm that a
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dog sniff, by its nature, is a separate category of search and is therefore reasonable per se under
%
this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
A.

A Sniff of Air by a Trained Narcotics Detection Dotz Outside a House Is
Constitutional when Based on Reasonable Suspicion.

Reasonable suspicion is the appropriate standard to determine the constitutionality of
Franky’s sniff outside Respondent’s house. This Court has recognized that various discrete
search methods need not be based on probable cause by weighing government interests and
methods versus an individual’s privacy interest. Because the government’s interest in law
enforcement outweighs the minimal invasion into Respondent’s privacy interest, reasonable
suspicion is the appropriate standard to use in this case. Here, Detective Pedraja had reasonable
suspicion to initiate the dog sniff based on the totality of the circumstances; as a result the search
was reasonable.
This Court has identified contexts in which law enforcement may perform a search
without probable cause. In Katz, Justice Harlan acknowledged that “under the Fourth
Amendment, warrants are the general rule, to which the legitimate needs of law enforcement
may demand specific exceptions. It will be time enough to consider any such exceptions when
an appropriate occasion presents itself...389 U.S. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice
Harlan further noted that the plain view doctrine is one exception to the Warrant Clause. Id. at
361. Since Katz, this Court has identified numerous appropriate exceptions to the Warrant
Clause, in which searches may be performed without a warrant or probable cause. See Brigham
City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398,405-06 (2006) (officers may enter a private home without a

warrant or consent under exigent circumstances); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass ’n, 489 U.S.
602, 604 (1989) (certain toxicological testing without consent constitutes a search that is not
subject to the Warrant Clause); Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 125 (certain field testing does not require a
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Air Pollution Variance Bd. of Colo. v. W. Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 864-65 (1974)

(some administrative searches are not subject to warrant requirement). Accordingly, this Court
t'

honors prior holdings by identifying discrete categories of searches that are not subject to the
Warrant Clause. This Court should hold that this sniff of air by a trained narcotics detection dog
is not subject to the Warrant Clause.
To determine the application of the Warrant Clause, this Court asks whether a method of
search is a reasonable government intrusion upon an individual’s privacy interest. Ter/y v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). The Terry Court stated that, “there is ‘no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search (or seize) against the invasion which
the search (or seizure) entails.’” Id. at 21 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35,
536-37 (1967)). In Terry, a police officer stopped three individuals whom he suspected of
preparing to rob a bank; the officer seized and searched each suspect without obtaining a warrant
or possessing probable cause. Id. at 7. This Court held that the searches and seizures were
constitutional despite the lack of probable cause because the officer had reasonable suspicion
that the suspects were contemplating violating the law and that they possessed weapons. Id. at
28.
This Court continues to apply the balancing test articulated in Terry. See Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); Texas v. Brown, 462 U.S. 730, 739 (1983); Place, 462 U.S. at

703. In Place, this court affirmed the state of the law as a “balance [between] the nature and
quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of
the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” 462 U.S. at 703. The Place Court
confirmed that “effective crime prevention and detection” are legitimate governmental interests
that may justify a search or seizure with less than probable cause. Id. at 704.
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Contrary to Respondent’s belief, effective crime prevention and detection are adequate
governmental interests to authorize a dog sniff that minimally intrudes on a privacy interest.
Officer safety is not the only government interest that authorizes a minimal intrusion on a
privacy interest. The Court stated that “[r]espondent suggests that absent some special law
enforcement interest such as officer safety, a generalized interest in law enforcement cannot
justify an intrusion on an individual’s Fourth Amendment interests in the absence of probable
cause. Our prior cases, however, do not support this proposition.” Placcy 462 U.S. at 703-04.
In addition, the Place Court emphasized careful analysis of the context of a search or
seizure, in light of reasonable suspicion of a crime, to determine whether a detention and
investigation violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 705-07. Specifically, the Place Court was
“asked to apply the principles of Terty v. Ohio, [], to permit such seizures on the basis of
reasonable, articulable suspicion, premised on objective facts, that the [item to be searched]
contain[ed] contraband or evidence of a crime.” Id. at 702 (internal citation omitted). The Court
concluded that it was appropriate to extend the Terry analysis, in which an officer stopped and
frisked three suspects, to a different fact pattern in which a dog sniffed luggage at an airport. Id.
This Court should apply the same Terry analysis to the facts in this case to determine
whether the actions of Detectives Pedraja and Bartelt, as well as Franky, required a warrant.
Detectives Pedraja and Bartelt were acting pursuant to the government’s strong interest in law
enforcement and crime prevention, just like the officers in Terry and Place. See Place, 462 U.S.
at 704. Any perceived lack of officer safety concerns is not conclusive, given the context and
method of search used in this case. See id. The dog sniff and attempted knock and talk
performed by Detectives Pedraja and Bartelt with Franky were minimally invasive. Here, the
minimal intrusion upon Respondent’s privacy interest, when weighed against the government’s
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strong interest in law enforcement and crime prevention is determinative: law enforcement
officials should not be required to obtain a warrant or to possess probable cause before allowing
a dog to sniff air. Instead, the appropriate standard is reasonable suspicion.
1.

The reasonable suspicion standard is appropriate because the
government’s crime prevention interests outweigh the minimal invasion
upon Respondent’s privacy interest.

Reasonable suspicion is the hallmark of constitutional searches upon less than probable
cause. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30; see also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). In
Cortez, the Supreme Court articulated the reasonable suspicion concept used in the Terry

decision: “the essence of all that has been written is that the totality of the circumstances—the
whole picture—must be taken into account.” 449 U.S. at 417. Courts verify the existence of
reasonable suspicion prior to a search by analyzing “objective observations, information from
police reports, if such are available, and consideration of the modes or patterns of operation of
certain kinds of lawbreakers.” Id. at 418. This Court acknowledged that “a trained officer draws
inferences and makes deductions—inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained
person.” Id. In Cortez, the Court concluded that the totality of the circumstances “must be seen
and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the
field of law enforcement.” Id.
Here, because the government interest in law enforcement and crime prevention
outweighs the minimal intrusion created by Franky’s sniff of air, this Court should limit the use
of dog sniff searches by applying the reasonable suspicion standard. The totality of the
circumstances test identified in Cortez appropriately guides this Court’s analysis of Detective
Pedraja’s decision to allow Franky to sniff air outside Respondent’s house. See id. at 417. This
Court should identify Detective Pedraja’s inferences and deductions based on observable facts as
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interpreted by law enforcement officers to determine whether Detective Pedraja possessed
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at Respondent’s hous^. See Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.
2.

The record confirms that Detective Pedraja possessed reasonable suspicion
to initiate the dog sniff.

Detective Pedraja had reasonable suspicion to permit a trained narcotics dog to sniff the
air outside Respondent’s house based upon the totality of the circumstances. Detective Pedraja’s
investigation of the anonymous tip provided the reasonable suspicion necessary to use a dog sniff
based on his training and experience.
Detective Pedraja is trained and experienced in identifying illegal drugs generally, and
has specifically investigated hydroponic marijuana cultivation operations. (J.A. 5, 37.)
Detective Pedraja observed the absence of vehicles in the driveway and noted the window blinds
were closed. (J.A. 9.) Furthermore, Detective Pedraja observed that an air-conditioner was
running prior to Franky’s sniff, and concluded that the unit ran continuously, without recycling,
for at least 15 minutes. (J.A. 37.) Because it was approximately 66 degrees Fahrenheit that
morning,'^ and in light of the common use of air-conditioners to regulate the heat created by
lamps used in hydroponic marijuana cultivation. Detective Pedraja possessed reasonable
suspicion necessary to allow a drug detection dog to alert to the presence of contraband while
outside Respondent’s house.
Here, the form of the search is crucial; Detective Pedraja possessed the reasonable
suspicion necessary to perform a minimally invasive search. An anonjmous tip, lack of vehicle
in a driveway, drawn blinds, and a constantly-running air-conditioning unit may not give rise to
probable cause to enter a home. However, these observations in conjunction with the inferences

* Quality Controlled Local Climatological Data: Hourly Observations Table Opa Locka Airport Miami, FL for Dec.
2006, NOAA, http://cdo.ncdc.noaa.gov/qclcd/QCLCD (last visited Oct. 2,2012).

and deductions of a trained narcotics detective provide reasonable suspicion to allow a narcotics
detection dog to approach, sit down at, and then depart from Respondent’s front door.
The presence of the dog was not invasive. Franky did not, and could not, breach the
closed and unanswered door. Nor could the dog identify or communicate any private activity
occurring inside Respondent’s house because the cloud of narcotic odor existed outside the
house. Rather, Franky could only alert to the presence of narcotic odor outside the house.
Additionally, Franky is trained to alert to contraband by sitting, as opposed to barking or some
other form of attention-grabbing activity. Accordingly, because the search performed by Franky
outside of Respondent’s house was minimally intrusive, it could be performed upon the
detective’s finding of a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Respondent’s house contained a
hydroponic marijuana cultivation operation.
3.

If this Court holds the record inadequate to conclude that reasonable
suspicion existed to allow the dog sniff, this Court should remand the case
to a trial court for additional findings of fact.

If this Court is unable to conclude whether Detective Pedraja had reasonable suspicion,
the Court should reverse the decision of the Florida Supreme Court and remand this case to
determine the existence of reasonable suspicion prior to the use of a dog sniff. In doing so, this
Court should clarify that the investigating officer must possess reasonable suspicion prior to the
use of a narcotics detection dog and not prior to a request. As identified in Terry and Place, the
Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable government intrusions. See 392 U.S. at 9; 462
U.S. at 703. A request that a dog be brought to a location is not an intrusion. Furthermore,
narcotics detection dogs and dog handlers are limited resources due to the extensive training they
require, and so they must be carefully managed by law enforcement agencies. Accordingly,
prudent scheduling of narcotics detection dogs and handlers should not be impeded by requiring

an investigating ol'llccr to possess reasonable snspici<ni before requesting the sei’viccs of a Hog.
This Court should establish an appropriate restriction on the use of narcotics detection dogs by
requiring that investigating officers possess reasonable suspicion before going ahead with a dog
sniff, rather than imposing the requirement before requesting the dog sniff.
B.

A Sniff of Air bv a Trained Narcotics Detection Doe Is Reasonable Per Se.

Rather than question whether a dog sniff is constitutional, this Court has determined the
legality of the overarching police activity within which a dog sniff is performed. This Court has
held that when the police activity is constitutional, the dog sniff is also constitutional. See
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408. Similarly, this Court has indicated that a dog sniff may be

constitutional, even when holding that the broad police activity violated the Fourth Amendment.
See City ofIndianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000). This Court should affirm its

conclusion that a dog sniff is sui generis and hold that Franky’s presence did not redefine the
legality of the investigation of Detectives Pedraja and Bartelt, because a dog sniff is a per se
reasonable component of police activity.
In the context of the Fourth Amendment, this Court has characterized a sniff of air by a
trained narcotics detection dog as sni generis - a category of search unto itself. See Place, 462
U.S. at 707; Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408. In so identifying the dog sniff, this Court has repeatedly
concluded that a sniff of air by a trained narcotics detection dog does not change the character or
otherwise “transform [police activity] into a search [subject to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth
Amendment].” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40; see also Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408; Place, 462 U.S. at
707.
In Edmond, Caballes, and Place, this Court relied on factors other than the dog sniff to
determine whether the questioned police conduct was constitutional. First, in Place, the Court

ultimately suppressed evidence of drugs, despite a lawful dog sniff, because the luggage in which
drugs were discovered was detained by authorities for an i^preasonable amount of time. Place,
462U.S. at 709-10.
Likewise in Caballes, this Court concluded that a dog sniff during a lawful traffic stop
did not alter the legality of the stop. 543 U.S. at 409. The Caballes Court emphasized tliat the
traffic stop was constitutional based on its minimal duration, and that the addition of a trained
narcotics detection dog outside the vehicle during the stop “does not violate the Fourth
Amendment.” Id.
Furthermore, in Edmond, this Court distinguished the dog sniff from unconstitutional
police activity. 531 U.S. at 40. There, Indianapolis instituted vehicle checkpoints at which
drivers were stopped, a narcotics detection dog walked around the vehicle, and a police officer
visually scanned the vehicle and requested a driver license and registration. Id. at 35. The Court
affirmed that the dog sniff was not suspect, but held that “the checkpoints violate the Fourth
Amendment[]” because they constituted indiscriminate seizures in the general interest of crime
control. Id. at 48.
This Court should follow the reasoning in Place, Caballes, and Edmond by questioning
whether the attempted knock and talk was legal and acknowledging that the nature of Detective
Pedraja’s conduct was not altered by the dog sniff. Detectives Pedraja and Bartelt were legally
present at Respondent’s front door. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179-80; Morsman, 394 So.2d at 409.
Accordingly, this Court should not redefine the legality of the detectives’ presence based merely
on the addition of a police dog. Notably, the record provides no indication that Respondent was
aware of, or embarrassed by, the presence of the police dog until after he was detained for
operating a hydroponic marijuana grow operation.
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Finally, this Court may rely on the reasoning in Edmond to establish reasonable limits to
the use of police dogs based on the Fourth Amendment, 't'he Edmond opinion properly identifies
a dog sniff as a component of police activity and focuses scrutiny on the overarching police
activity. See 531 U.S. at 40. In doing so, the Edmond Court verified that a dog sniff is sui
generis, providing a meaningful balance between the legitimate interest in fighting narcotics

production and trafficking and individual protections against unreasonable searches.
Accordingly, a general search from house to house would still violate the Fourth Amendment,
regardless of the presence of a police dog. This Court should affirm the Edmond opinion that
indiscriminate searches are unconstitutional, which establishes a constitutional limit on the use of
a narcotics detection dog. However, where a police officer is legally present at an individual’s
front door, the constitutionally appropriate conduct of that officer should not be transformed by
the mere presence of a police dog.
This Court should hold that a sniff of air by a trained narcotics detection dog is sui
generis, and thereby conclude that Franky’s sniff was reasonable per se. This Court should

analyze the police investigation, within which Franky sniffed air outside Respondent’s house, to
determine whether that overarching activity was constitutional. A review of Detective Pedraja’s
investigation of an anonymous tip, wherein he observed facts and made inferences based on his
^

law enforcement experience, and so attempted a knock and talk, reveals that the overarching
police activity was constitutional. Because Franky’s sniff of air outside Respondent’s house
could not transform Detective Pedraja’s conduct into a constitutional violation, evidence of

#

Respondent’s hydroponic marijuana grow operation should be admissible.

32

CONCLUSION
This Court should overturn the Florida Supreme Court’s suppression of narcotics
evidence against Respondent. While both the United States and Florida Constitutions protect
people against unreasonable searches, the use of a drug sniffing dog was reasonable.
This is because Respondent did not have a privacy interest in his front porch. He had not
manifested a privacy interest in that area, showing he did not have a subjective privacy
expectation. Further, society is not prepared to consider a privacy interest in an exposed front
porch reasonable because that area is not within the curtilage of Respondent’s home. Florida law
states that residents of homes have no privacy interest in their front porches.
A dog sniff is also a permissible use of technology because it is non-invasive and
discriminate. The practice of dog sniffs is analogous to the use of airplanes by police officers,
which this Court has validated as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Finally, this Court’s
jurisprudence holds that dog sniffs are minimally invasive and detect only contraband, and that a
person does not carry a privacy interest in such items. These holdings have been followed in
lower courts to validate dog sniffs.
Alternatively, Franky’s sniff outside Respondent’s door was constitutional because it was
predicated upon Detective Pedraja’s reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at Respondent’s
house. First, the government’s interest in crime prevention and law enforcement outweigh the
minimal intrusion of Respondent’s privacy interest caused by Franky’s sniff of air, so the Court
should apply a reasonable suspicion standard to the dog sniff Second, the totality of the
circumstances test confirms that Detective Pedraja had reasonable suspicion based on his
experience investigating hydroponic marijuana grow operations, as well as his factual
observations that confirmed the anonymous tip about marijuana production.
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Finally, Franky’s sniff outside Respondent’s door is constitutional because it is
reasonable per se as one component of Detective Pedraja’s investigation of an anonymous tip.
This Court’s jurisprudence holds that a dog sniff is reasonable when performed in the context of
a constitutional police activity. Franky’s sniff was constitutional because it was performed
where and when Detective Pedraja was legally present outside Respondent’s house. Therefore,
this Court should reverse the Florida Supreme Court’s decision to suppress evidence of
Respondent’s hydroponic marijuana cultivation operation and hold that evidence admissible.
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